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Litigation, Privacy and the Electronic Age t
Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan:
Abstract: In this speech, the Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan discusses one
problem in the legal system created by advances in technology - the tension
between the privacy interests of litigants and the increased availability of
information in modern society. Although openness is a central tenet of the
legal system, until recent advancements in information technology,
significant logistical difficulties in obtaining records on all but the most
notable cases made most information unavailable to the public. However,
advances in technology have greatly facilitated access to the universe of
legal doents. Judge Kaplan explores the potential consequences of increased
availability of information in a number of contexts and argues that it imposes
an important responsibility on Courts to rethink the boundaries between
public and private in litigation and to exercise increased caution in dealing
with processes that touch on these boundaries.
Cite as: 4 YALE SYMP. L. & TECH. 1 (2001)
I. INTRODUCTION
1 It is a pleasure to be with you this afternoon and to have an
opportunity to discuss one of the major challenges facing the courts -
adaptation of law and the legal system to the special problems and
opportunities created by the stunning advances in information technology
that we all have seen and presumably will continue to see for the
foreseeable future. Some of these problems have drawn a vast amount of
attention, notably the intersection of copyright law and the Internet, as
evidenced by the Napster, DVD and MP3.com cases. But there is another
problem of at least equal importance that has drawn considerably less
attention - the increasing clash between the privacy interests of litigants,
both individual and corporate, and the vast explosion in the availability of
information in our society. It is a conflict, moreover, that in many ways is
t Edited transcript of remarks delivered to the Yale Law and Technology Society on
November 6, 2000.
: Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
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just beginning and that will command more and more of our attention as
time goes by.
II. THE GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM
2 The notion of a problem concerning the privacy interests of litigants
initially might strike one as involving an oxymoron. After all, openness is a
central value in our society and our legal system. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees criminal defendants the right to a public trial. Court records long
have been presumptively open to public inspection. 1 Gag orders are subject
to the most intense constitutional scrutiny.2 But despite the apparent
transparency of the system, the reality long has been very different except
in the most extraordinary cases.
A. The Practical Obscurity of Information
3 To begin with, for a great many years, extending well into my early
years in practice, the very existence of litigation that might attract public
attention or otherwise threaten privacy interests usually was not widely
known. While the courthouse doors and files were open, there were far too
many courthouses to visit in the hope of finding something of interest. In
fact, there was at least one major state - New York - in which it was possible
until recent years to start a lawsuit and litigate it virtually to the point of trial
without the creation of any public record of its existence. So unless one side
or the other went to the press or another interested audience, there often
was no practical way to learn of a lawsuit.
4 Even if the existence of a lawsuit was known, it used to be - and to a
considerable extent still is - hard for an outsider to find out what was or is
going on. Pretrial exchanges of doents typically take place between the
attorneys and are not on the public record. Deposition transcripts in some
courts usually are not filed and so often do not become available for public
inspection.
5 Finally, and perhaps most important, the means of public dissemination
- the newspapers, magazines, radio and television - usually were broad
spectrum media. The only cases that drew their attention were those of
interest to a large, usually general interest audience. So litigation did not
pose much of a threat to the privacy of ordinary people or of most
businesses.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1995).
2 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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B. Technological Advances and the Erosion of Privacy
6 This practical obscurity of information generated in all but the most
exceptional cases has been eroded by technological advances. The difficulty
of finding litigation involving a particular person or entity began to disappear
in the 1970's with the introduction of Lexis-Nexis and then Westlaw, which
made it a simple matter to find many cases. And today, it is much easier.
We now have a case index on the Internet that allows anyone to determine
whether any individual or entity is a party to a federal law suit anywhere in
the country and, if so, the title and docket number of the case. PACER,
another system in the federal judiciary, gives access to the docket sheets in
federal cases anywhere in the nation. Many courts, including my own, have
web sites on which many judges post decisions and even routine orders. And
the most significant change from the courts' point of view is right around the
corner. The federal courts have been developing an electronic case filing
system in which all or most litigation doents will be filed in electronic form
and accessible electronically. That system already is in use in a few courts
on a prototype basis, and we are not far away from rolling it out to the
entire federal system.
7 These changes have been paralleled by changes in the media. The
development of cable made it feasible to generate content for narrow
audiences. This in turn meant that litigation, sometimes even routine
litigation, suddenly was of interest to some content providers. The most
notable example, of course, is Court TV, which began broadcasting trials
live.
8 Cable, however, has its limits. The market for coverage of routine trials
is limited. Many courts do not welcome cameras in their courtrooms. So
cable has not, as far as I can see, really taken off. But an even bigger
change has come with the Internet.
9 The Internet has created an infinite demand for content. There is
someone out there who wants to post almost anything one can imagine.
There are web sites maintained by interest groups, web sites following
particular kinds of litigation, and web sites run by law firms. Search engines
make all of this readily accessible to anyone in the world. The potential for
invasion of privacy is enormous.
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111 The earliest manifestation of the clash between the presumptive
openness of court proceedings and privacy, I think, was the development of
the now long-standing problem of confidentiality orders to protect
information turned over in the discovery process and sometimes used at
trial.
12 The starting point is Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
That rule provides that a court may take any appropriate action "to protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense" as part of the discovery process, including prohibition of
the discovery of its disclosure. All that is required is a showing of good
cause. And as the practical obscurity of information in court files has eroded,
controversy has developed regarding the cirstances in which confidentiality
orders should be entered and the form that such orders should take.
A. Modern Litigation and Restrictions on Discovery
1]13 The broad contours of the arguments are plain enough. Proponents of
high transparency argue that courts do public business and that the public
therefore has a right to know how they do it. Further, they say, certain types
of litigation such as products liability cases often generate information, the
dissemination of which is in the interest of public health and safety. On the
other hand, there are those who argue that the fact that one is involved in a
lawsuit ought not to give any pair of curious eyes the right to sift through
sensitive business or personal information.
114 I am not here to propose a resolution of that debate at an abstract
level. Indeed, I suspect it cannot be resolved at an abstract level. But I do
want to focus on the intensely practical consequences of the debate for the
effective handling of litigation in federal courts.
1]15 The showing of good cause that Rule 26 requires for entry of a
confidentiality order is readily and swiftly made where the material in
question is the paradigmatic trade secret, such as the secret formula for the
manufacture of a popular soft drink. Such particularized determinations of
good cause once were common, back when it was necessary to protect only
the crown jewels with such an order because the chances were great that no
one would even know of the lawsuit. But that situation has changed.
16 Modern litigation of all sorts requires disclosure of vast amounts of
information of substantial sensitivity to the person required to make the
disclosure. Antitrust litigation frequently requires disclosure of pricing data,
strategic plans, and a host of other material which the disclosing party is
loathe to place on the public record or reveal to its competitors. Employment
4
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discrimination litigation almost invariably involves the disclosure of
personnel evaluations and salary information, to name just a couple of
areas, not only of the plaintiff but of the plaintiff's comparators, and
sometimes of quite scandalous allegations against or comments about
various individuals. Even personal injury cases typically require disclosure of
plaintiffs' medical records which often contain highly sensitive data. In fact,
almost any case involves one or another sort of sensitive information. And
now that information in court files is so readily found and disseminated,
litigants are insisting on far broader protection and they want it in a great
many cases.
1117 This change in the climate, I suggest, makes it plain that if parties
seeking discovery insisted upon a showing of good cause as to each bit of
sensitive information, the entire system of civil justice would grind to a halt.
Both the lawyers and the judges would have little time in which to do
anything but litigate the good cause issue, doent by doent and page by
page. So the system has evolved to accommodate this concern.
118 In recent years, sophisticated litigators have come to understand that
the costs in time, their clients' money and the courts' good will of insisting
on item-by-item good cause determinations far outweigh the potential
benefits. Lawyers generally enter into a fairly standard protective order that
permits either party, as well as non-party witnesses, to designate as
confidential doents or other information that the producing party in good
faith asserts is entitled to protection. Once the information is designated as
confidential, the other side is obliged to use it solely for purposes of the
litigation and not to disclose it to others unless and until the court
determines that protection is inappropriate. The confidentiality designation,
however, does not bar the party seeking the disclosure from challenging the
confidentiality designation before the court. If such a challenge is made, the
party that designated the information confidential bears the burden of
persuading the court that good cause exists for according the information
the relevant level of protection. And there are variations on the theme,
including for example an even more secure level of protection which restricts
dissemination of extremely sensitive data to attorneys or even to outside
counsel. The key point, however, is that confidentiality designations made
under such orders seldom are challenged, so the courts and the litigants
usually are spared the burden of litigating the good cause issue.
B. The Limits of Confidentiality
19 As a general matter, orders of this kind are a perfectly practical
solution to what otherwise would be a very troublesome problem. Although
one of the magistrate judges in our court recently declined to approve such
5
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an order absent a detailed showing of the need for it, 3 I believe that this is
an exception to a broad tendency of district courts to approve and even to
require such orders over opposition.4 The fact is that good cause exists to
restrict the dissemination of at least some information turned over in much
modern litigation. If the parties voluntarily agree to protect confidentiality,
there usually will be no reason to question their judgment. But that of
course does not completely address the problem for two reasons.
]20 First of all, as I indicated a moment ago, there are some kinds of
litigation in which the private interests of the parties are not the only
relevant considerations. Discovery in an action involving a claim that a
broadly distributed product is unsafe, for example, may implicate public
policy concerns that could make a confidentiality order inappropriate,
whatever the wishes of the litigants before the court. I express no view on
what might be the proper course in such a case, but litigants must be aware
that courts may well take such concerns into account, even against their
expressed wishes.
21 Second, it is important to understand that there may be limits to the
protection that parties to such a consensual protective order may rely upon.
Where confidentiality protection rests on a judicial determination of good
cause, the parties may rely upon the maintenance of confidentiality even in
the face of a subsequent challenge by a non-party.5 Where there is no
judicial determination of good cause, however, the parties to such an order
take their chances that a court later will conclude, in response to a challenge
by the press or another non-party, that good cause is absent and require
disclosure. 6
22 But confidentiality orders now are beginning to look like the thin edge
of the wedge as respects privacy in litigation. There now are other concerns,
including electronic case files or ECF.
IV. ELECTRONIC CASE FILES AND THE INTERNET
23 When ECF is in full operation, most court papers will be filed in digital
form. They will be accessible over the Internet. Someone interested in
digging for information on someone already is able to search an Internet-
3 Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Yang, No. 99 Civ. 10769 (RPP) (KNF), 2000 WL 628713 (S.D.N.Y. May
16, 2000).
4 See, e.g., Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 72 (3d Cir. 2000); Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987); DeCarlo v.
Archie Comic Pubs., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 2344 (LAK), 2000 WL 781863 (S.D.N.Y. June 20,
2000).
5 See Geller v. Branic International Realty Corp., 212 F.3d 734 (2d Cir. 2000).
6 See Greater Miami Baseball Club L.P. v. Selig, 955 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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accessible case index in order to determine whether the subject is or has
been a party to litigation in any federal court in the nation. Having located
the titles and docket numbers of any such cases, the investigator then will
be able to go to the courts' web sites, scroll through the docket sheets, call
up on the screen an image of every doent in the court file, and download or
print out whatever may be of interest unless, of course, public access is
limited in some way. That information may be of only private interest to the
searcher. Or it may be of interest to a somewhat broader audience, in which
case its availability will be promoted on the Internet.
24 At the moment, the Federal Rules provide that "all papers...
required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court within a
reasonable time after service" although district courts have the authority to
exclude discovery papers from this requirement.7 The content of court files
therefore often includes very personal information. Most court files contain
litigants' home addresses. Case files in personal injury suits often contain
the most intimate sorts of medical information. Bankruptcy files contain
debtors' Social Security numbers. The examples go on and on. And ECF,
unless the current system is changed, will end what is left of the practical
inaccessibility of nominally public court files by making them available and
searchable anywhere in the world. The danger of mischief is serious.
125 One partial answer is plain enough. Under existing rules, district
courts may take advantage of Rule 5(d) to prohibit the routine filing of
discovery materials. We have done that already in the Southern District of
New York, although I am frank to say that I gather we did so because we do
not have room for it and not out of concerns about privacy. But this goes
only part of the way because much sensitive information finds its way into
motion papers and other filed materials.
26 As so often is the case, the technology initially got out in front of
these issues. But the relevant committees of the Judicial Conference of the
United States have begun to focus on the privacy issues. A number of policy
alternatives are on the table, including redefinition of what constitutes the
"public file" in a federal case, limiting access to ECF or to certain categories
of information within ECF, and imposing a waiting period between a request
for access and its grant in order to permit the raising of objections. These
and other possibilities deserve close and prompt attention.
V. LITIGATION AS CONTENT
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d).
7
Caplan: Litigation, Privacy and the Electronic Age
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2001
27 Thus far, I have been discussing information, the disclosure of which
is sought because it is necessary for the resolution of the case before the
court. But the increasing dissemination of information of limited general
interest to narrow audiences that are intensely concerned with it has
broadened the extent to which material concerning specific lawsuits is of
interest to particular segments of the media. And this has created another
risk - the use of a lawsuit, or of particular events in a lawsuit, to generate
content for media outlets rather than to obtain evidence useful in deciding
the case. Let me give you two recent examples of what appear to me to
have been efforts to use litigation to generate media content rather than to
accomplish a genuine litigation purpose.
128 The first was in a case called Paisley Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Uptown
Productions,8 which was an action brought by an entertainer who then styled
himself as The Artist Formerly Known As Prince and now, I gather, has
reverted to Prince. He and others sued the operators of an Internet web site
devoted to Prince - something like an electronic fan club. The defendants
promptly sought to take Prince's deposition and to record it on videotape.
The plaintiffs sought a protective order barring the videotaping of the
deposition on the theory that the defendants did not need the videotape for
any legitimate litigation purpose, but intended to post the videotape on their
web site in order to increase its traffic. The defendants opposed the motion
but were unwilling to agree not to post the videotape on the Internet
although they were unable to offer any reason for permitting its public
dissemination. So while the court permitted the videotaping to proceed on
the ground that it might be useful in cross-examination at trial, it imposed
stringent conditions designed to ensure that the tape was used only for
purposes of the litigation and not posted on the Internet. 9
1]29 What appeared to me to be an analogous incident occurred in the
DVD case that I tried this summer, Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes.10 As I am sure you all know, that was a suit by major motion
picture studios under the Digital Millenium Copyright Act1" to enjoin a web
site operator from posting or linking to a computer program that decrypted
DVDs containing copyrighted motion pictures. During the course of the
pretrial proceedings, the defendants conducted a deposition of lack Valenti,
president of the Motion Picture Association of America. Here is what I wrote
about it at the time:
8 54 F. Supp.2d 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
9 Id. at 349.
10 111 F. Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
11 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq.
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Defendants' deposition of Jack Valenti... consisted in substantial part
of hypothetical questions, efforts to elicit legal opinions from a lay
witness, and argumentative questioning. Defendants subsequently
posted the deposition transcript on their web site. While they had a
right to do so, the nature of the deposition and the fact of the posting
support the view that the deposition was largely unnecessary and
conducted as it was for purposes unrelated to the resolution of the
factual issues in dispute in this action. 12
VI. CONCLUSION
30 The point of all of this, I suggest, is straightforward. Technology is
having a dramatic effect on litigation by making everything that takes place
in relation to a lawsuit instantly and practically available to all comers. The
practical obscurity that protected the privacy of information generated in
litigation, despite its theoretical public nature, is rapidly disappearing. That
in turn imposes two important responsibilities on courts. The first is to
rethink in light of new cirstances the boundary between what is public and
what is private in litigation, taking into account the need for public
accountability and the legitimate privacy interests of litigants. The second is
to exercise heightened vigilance lest their processes be used for purposes
other than those for which courts traditionally exercise their powers to
compel the production of information. And there is more at stake here than
simply accommodating the competing interests in personal privacy and
public accountability.
31 We all are aware of the burgeoning of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms. One of the reasons for their growth is the privacy they afford.
There is a growing dissatisfaction with the fact that our system of civil
justice sometimes does not offer adequate protection for this important
value. That dissatisfaction will increase exponentially if we do not adequately
deal with privacy in the electronic age. We have to recognize that the public
system of civil justice is competing with these free market alternatives just
as surely as the post office is competing with Federal Express and the
Internet. And the stakes are the same. If the public system cannot give the
customers what they want, the customers who can afford to go elsewhere
will do so.
32 We don't have to look far to imagine the consequences of an
expansion of that trend. There are indications all around us in New York and
other cities - in their school systems, their housing stock, and in countless
12 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 104 F. Supp.2d 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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other examples. If the public justice system cannot give appropriate
protection to privacy interests, we increasingly will have ADR for the rich and
litigation for the poor and those lacking any choice in the matter.
33 Those of us who believe that a system of public civil justice - one that
is fair to all and embodies the values of our society - is at the very heart of
the notion of a government of laws, rebel at such a notion. So we must
understand the potential impact of the electronic age on privacy in litigation.
We must focus attention on this issue and assist the federal and state courts
in striking the appropriate balance between privacy and public access as
technology increasingly makes readily available to everyone that which
previously lay unknown in dusty case files in clerks' offices and courthouse
basements.
10
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 3 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol3/iss1/3
